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Decided on April 28, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County
Michael LiSeabrooks, Petitioner,
against
Sean Pimento, "JOHN DOE," & "JANE DOE", Respondents.

Index No. L & T 3107502021

To: Nora Kenty, Esq., Mobilization for Justice, Inc., Attorneys for RespondentPimento
&
Craig K. Tyson, Esq., Law Office of Craig K. Tyson, Attorney for Petitioner
Shorab Ibrahim, J.
RECITATION, AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 2219(A), OF THE PAPERS CONSIDERED
IN THE REVIEW OF THIS MOTION BY RESPONDENT TO DISMISS THE
PROCEEDING: NYSCEF Documents No. 9 through 21.
UPON THE FOREGOING CITED PAPERS, THE DECISION/ORDER IN THIS MOTION
IS AS FOLLOWS:

FACTS
For the purposes of deciding the within motion, the salient facts are these: respondent
lives at 2736 Fenton Avenue, Second Floor, Room 2, Bronx, NY (the unit); the notice of
termination was allegedly affixed to the door and subsequently mailed to the unit, with no
floor indicated; after attempts on September 21, 2021 at 1:18 PM and September 22, 2021 at
6:07 PM, the notice of petition and petition were allegedly affixed to and subsequently
mailed to 2736 Fenton Avenue, First Floor, Room 2.
ARGUMENTS
Respondent argues that service of the termination notice was not upon the property
sought to be recovered since, according to the affidavit of service, no floor is indicated. The
notice of petition and petition were similarly improperly served as the affidavit of service
indicates service upon the wrong floor. Additionally, respondent argues that petitioner did not
exercise "due diligence" before resorting to "nail and mail" service.
Petitioner counters that there is only one "room 2" in the subject two floor building and
implies that the defects in the affidavits of service are mere drafting errors. Furthermore,
petitioner argues that service of the notice of petition and petition were in accordance with
instructions appearing on the court's website.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
"Reasonable Application" and "Due Diligence"
As of September 2, 2022, Chapter 417 of the Laws of 2021 (the Act), required service
of the notice of petition "be made by personal delivery to the respondent, unless such service
cannot be made with due diligence, in which case service may be made under section 735 of
the [*2]real property actions and proceedings law."[FN1] (see Bel Air Leasing LP v Johnston,
73 Misc 3d 809, 810, 157 NYS3d 346 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2021]).
Thus, before resorting to the "nail and mail" service performed, petitioner was required
to exercise due diligence.
Due diligence requires more effort than the "reasonable application" standard found in
RPAPL § 735. (see Bel Air Leasing LP v Johnston, 73 Misc 3d at 810, citing Brooklyn Hgts.
Realty Co. v Gliwa, 92 AD2d 602, 459 NYS2d 793 [2nd Dept 1983]). While one attempt

inside of normal working hours and one attempt outside those hours may satisfy reasonable
application, (see 1199 Housing Corp v Griffin, 136 Misc 2d 689, 691, 520 NYS2d 93 [Civ
Ct, New York County 1987], citing Eight Associates v Hynes, 102 AD2d 746, 476 NYS2d
881 [1st Dept 1985]), due diligence is not so easily met or defined. (see Barnes v City of New
York, 51 NY2d 906, 907, 415 NE2d 979 [1980] ("Indeed, in determining the question of
whether due diligence has been exercised, no rigid rule could properly be prescribed.");
Greene Major Holdings, LLC v Trailside at Hunter, LLC, 148 AD3d 1317, 1320, 49 NYS3d
769 [3rd Dept 2017] (While the precise manner to accomplish due diligence is not rigidly
prescribed, the requirement that due diligence be exercised must be strictly observed.)).
Here, service was designed to comply with the reasonable application standard rather
than the due diligence standard. Petitioner concedes this in pointing to the court webpage,
which specifically refers to that provision of the RPAPL. (see NYSCEF Doc. 17 and NYC
Housing Court (nycourts.gov) [last accessed on April 15, 2022]).
It is, of course, possible for a petitioner to meet the due diligence standard when
reasonable application would suffice. (see, e.g., Avgush v Berrahu, 17 Misc 3d 85, 86, 847
NYS2d 343 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2007]).
However, the two attempts here, on consecutive weekdays, with no further information
provided, does not satisfy due diligence. (see Bel Air Leasing LP v Johnston, 73 Misc 3d at
811812 (Conspicuous place service under RPAPL § 735, without showing of genuine
inquiries made, does not suffice as due diligence service); see also Suero v Rivera, 74 Misc
3d 723, 725, 162 NYS3d 684 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2022]; Dolan v Linnen, 195 Misc 2d
298, 324, 753 NYS2d 682 [Civ Ct, Richmond County 2003] ("Two responsible attempts at
inhand or substituted service before resorting to conspicuous service satisfy reasonable
application but not due diligence."); Borg v Feeley, 56 Misc 3d 128(A), *1, 2017 NY Slip Op
50834(U), [App Term, 1st Dept 2017] ("Significantly, the affidavit of service does not
describe any efforts to ascertain the tenant's whereabouts, work schedule or business
address.")).
Reliance on the Court's Website
To be fair, petitioner does not argue that he has met the due diligence standard. Rather,
he argues that reasonable application sufficed because, as stated above, the court's website
referred to the RPAPL service standard. (see Opposition Affirmation at par. 11 & par. 18).

A review of the relevant webpage reveals it was last updated on February 18, 2020,
which was prior to the true onset of the Covid19 pandemic. The pandemic affected summary
eviction proceedings in many ways with the issuance of Executive and Administrative Orders
and the passage of new law. (see Cabrera v Humphrey, 192 AD2d 227, 230231, 140 NYS3d
609 [3rd [*3]Dept 2021]; Morrison Management LLC v Moreno, 71 Misc 3d 1230(A), *12,
2021 NY Slip Op 50528(U) [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2021]). It was and is incumbent upon
practitioners to know of and to adapt to these changes. (see Fielding v Kupferman, 65 AD3d
437, 440, 885 NYS2d 24 [1st Dept 2009] ("[A]n attorney is obligated to know the law
relating to the matter for which he/she is representing a client and it is the attorney's duty, 'if
he has not knowledge of the statutes, to inform himself, for, like any artisan, by undertaking
the work, he represents that he is capable of performing it in a skillful manner.' ") [citations
omitted]).
As service requirements are strictly construed, (see Macchia v Russo, 67 NY2d 592,
595, 505 NYS2d 591 [1986]), any reliance upon a webpage's recitation of service of process
requirements cannot render proper otherwise improper service.
The Property Sought to be Recovered
No matter the "proper" standard of service, petitioner fails to establish that service was
properly effectuated at the premises sought to be recovered. (see RPAPL § 735(1); Filancia v
Clarke, 62 Misc 3d 1212(A), *1, 2019 NY Slip Op 50122(U) [City Ct, Mount Vernon 2019]).
Normally, a proper affidavit of service creates a presumption of proper service upon a
respondent. (see Eros International PLC v Mangrove Partners, 191 AD3d 464, 142 NYS3d
21 [1st Dept 2021]; Reliable Abstract Co., LLC v 45 John Lofts, LLC, 152 AD3d 429, 58
NYS3d 365 [1st Dept 2017]).
Here, the petition, according to the affidavit of service, was served at the first floor. The
parties acknowledge that respondent resides on the second floor. Thus, the affidavit of service
is facially defective and insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the respondent. (see
Velocity Investments, Inc. v McCaffrey, 31 Misc 3d 308, 314, 921 NYS2d 799 [Dist. Ct.,
Nassau County 2011]; Mercogliano v Munroe, 22 Misc 3d 127(A), *1, 2009 NY Slip Op
50032(U) [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2009] (petition must be dismissed where
affidavit of service is facially defective)).[FN2]
Based on the above, judgment shall enter in respondent's favor dismissing this

proceeding. [FNJ]
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court. It will be posted to NYSCEF and
copies sent to the parties.
Dated: April 28, 2022
SO ORDERED,
Bronx, NY
/S/
SHORAB IBRAHIM, JHC
Footnotes

Footnote 1: The Act was the successor to the COVID Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure
Prevention Act (CEEFPA). (see L 2020, ch 381 , § 3, part A,§ 5 [2]).
Footnote 2: Though petitioner should have been aware of the defects in the affidavits of
service, he did not make any motions to try to address them.
Footnote 3: The other grounds for dismissal are denied as moot.
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